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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner, :
-v-

Case No.

88-0313

:

JON C. VASILACOPULOS,

:

PRIORITY CLASSIFICATION
NO. 13

Defendant-Respondent. :
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
RESPONSE TO QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion
to withdraw his plea of guilty to three felony counts of theft
by deception.
A. The record as a whole clearly demonstrates that
the trial court failed in its statutory compliance with Rule
11(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Utah Code Ann.
Section 77-35-ll[e]) when it accepted defendant's plea of guilty
to three counts of felony theft by deception.
3. The defendant's attorney's request for concurrent
sentences at the sentencing hearing is "after the fact."

The

violation of the Rule 11(e) mandate of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure occurred at the defendant's change of plea hearing
held on February 17, 1984.

Furthermore, Section 77-13-6 of

the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Utah Code Ann.,
1988, clearly sets no time limit for the withdrawal of a plea
of guilty by the defendant.
C. The defendant in the instant case more than clearly
satisfied his burden of showing good cause why he should be
permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to three counts of
felony theft by deception.
D. The Utah Court of Appeals properly applied by
Utah statutory law this Court's Rule 11(e) mandate and its
precedents of law as contained respectively therein.
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion,of which the defendant
now replies in opposition, is that of State v. Vasilacopulos,
756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The defendant submits that the petitioner in this
matter is the State of Utah.

They are currently seeking review

of the Utah Court of Appeals' decision entered on June 3, 1988.
Further, the State's Petition for Rehearing was denied on July
19, 1988.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear defendant's

response in opposition pursuant to the Utah Code Ann. with
respect to Section 78-2-2(5) as contained therein.
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The defendant in the instant case submits that the
controlling statutory provisions were reproduced in full in
the appendix of the petition of the State of Utah, in which
-2-

they are seeking review by Certiorari in this Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a criminal case of which the petitioner,
State of Utah, is seeking review by this Court.

The defendant

was charged with one second degree felony of theft by deception
on November 13, 1981 (R. 67). The information was subsequently
amended, charging the defendant in the second amended information
with twenty counts of felony theft by deception in violation
of the Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405, composed of fifteen second
degree felony counts and five third degree felony counts (R.
81-86).
The petitioner, State of Utah, fails to properly
and adequately state the true and correct facts of this case.
After the defendant was charged with the "initial" one second
degree felony count of theft by deception on November 13, 1981,
additional criminal charges were to follow.

Subsequently,

three days later on November 16, 1981, the defendant was charged
with four additional counts of felony theft by deception.
Then, some eleven months later, an additional fifteen counts
of felony theft by deception were charged.

Usually, this is

called "stacking the deck" against the defendant when the state
is fearful that they may not have a strong enough case against
the defendant, ultimately forcing the defendant into a plea
bargain on the dismissal of other counts, as were the facts
of this case that is presently before this Court for review.
-3-

Furthermore, the defendant submits that the past actions of
the State of Utah in the instant case were ones of malicious
prosecution.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS
The defendant's plea of guilty was accepted by the
trial court on February 17, 1984, to three counts of felony
theft by deception (R. 93). The defendant again appeared before
the trial court on August 12, 1985, for sentencing and was
ordered to serve three consecutive terms of incarceration in
the Utah State Prison for a maximum of twenty five years and
fined $20,000.00 (R. 157).
The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration
of sentence in November, 1985, a petiton for habeas corpus
relief in June, 1986, a motion for resentencing in February,
1987, and a motion to withdraw his plea in September, 1987.
The trial court denied the defendant's motions and dismissed
his petition.

The defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from

the trial court's denial of his motion for resentencing, a
petition for Writ of Mandamus, and a Notice of Appeal from
the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea
of guilty.

The above three actions were consolidated for appeal

by order of the Utah Court of Appeals on November 19, 1987,
as case number 87-0291-CA.
The Utah Court of Appeals, unanimously by a vote
of three to zero, reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty on June 3, 1988.
-4-

The

State's Petition for Rehearing was denied on July 19, 1988,
and the Utah Court of Appeals issued an order Staying the
Remittitur on July 21, 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant, Jon C. Vasilacopulos, was charged
with one second degree felony count of theft be deception on
November 13, 1981 (R. 67). The information was subsequently
amended several times, charging the defendant in an amended
information with twenty felony counts of theft by deception
(R. 81-86).
A preliminary hearing was held in the Fifth Circuit
Court on several occasions with respect to the instant case
which lasted approximately some seven months in itself, from
November 22, 1982, until May 17, 1983.

Furthermore, defendant

now submits that as of the date of the filing of the one original
count charging him with a felony of theft by deception on November
13, 1981, until the time of the last preliminary hearing which
was held on May 17, 1983, a time period of some eighteen months
had expired in the instant case.
The defendant was bound over for trial on eighteen
of the twenty felony counts of theft by deception (R. 5-6).
Further, defendant was arraigned on July 18, 1983, and received
a copy of the "complaint" through his counsel, who then waived
the reading of the information therein, and entered a plea
of not guilty to the eighteen counts of felony theft by deception
(R. 92).
-5-

The defendant appeared before the trial court on
February 17, 1984, and entered a plea of guilty to three counts
of felony theft by deception (R. 93). Further, defendant executed
an "affidavit of defendant" (R. 109-110), and also, a memorandum
agreement at the conclusion of the hearing (R. 103-108).
Then, on August 12, 1985, the defendant was sentenced
(R. 157-159).

Defendants sentences on the three felony counts

to which he pled [SIC] guilty were ordered by the trial court
to run consecutively (R. 157-159, and R. 342, p. 8 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant submits that a Writ of Certiorari should
not be granted by this Court pursuant to Rule 43(2) of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure, inasmuch as the decision of the
Utah Court of Appeals was, in fact, proper and consistent with
prior holdings in cases of this Honorable Court.

Furthermore,

the Utah Court of Appeals, under Rule 4B(A)(B)(C), Certification
by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, could have, at
their discretion, and on the affirmative vote of four judges
of the Court, certified the instant case for immediate transfer
to the Supreme Court for determination.
Also, under Rule 4(b) of the Utah Court of Appeals,
the petitioner, State of Utah, had the option available to
them to file a "suggestion for certification" to the Utah Supreme
Court to hear defendant's appeal, but failed to do so.

Now,

the petitioner, State of Utah, is using "Certiorari" to circumvent
the appellate process and the rights of the defendant as guaranteed
-6-

to him by "due process of law" under Article I, Sections 1,
8, 9, 10 and 12 of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and
also under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
Accordingly/ Rule 4(c)(1) of the Utah Court of Appeals
states in pertinent:
Rule 4(c): The Court of Appeals shall consider
certification only in the following cases:
(1) Cases which are of such nature that is so
apparent that the case should be decided by the Supreme
Court and that the Supreme Court would probably grant
a petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the case if
decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespective of how
the Court of Appeals might rule.
Further, Hornbook Law on the statutory interpretation
of the word "shall" does not allow for discretion to deviate.
In any event, if the Utah Court of Appeals would
have thought that their opinion in the instant case would be
reversed by the Utah Supreme Court by way of "Certiorari,"
the defendant is only led to believe that the Utah Court of
Appeals would have exercised its appellate discretion under
Rule 4B(A)(B) and (C) of the rules of the Utah Court of Appeals,
and then and there certified the defendant's case to the Utah
Supreme Court for final disposition.
ARGUMENT
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY
APPLIED THIS COURT'S PRECEDENTS IN
HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS PLEA OF GUILTY
The record in the instant case clearly establishes
-7-

that the trial court did not comply with all the statutory
requirements and applicable case law as required for both the
taking of guilty pleas under Rule 11(e), and attempts to withdraw
such pleas as set forth in the Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6.

The

request to withdraw a plea of guilty is not automatically or
mandatorily granted, but only upon a showing of good cause
and with leave of the court.

SEE: State v. Mildenall, 70 Utah

Adv. Rep. 17 (November 19, 1987).
Further, petitioner, State of Utah, cites the case
of State v. Forsyth, 560 P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1977), which states
in the pertinent part:
The court is not bound to any rigidity of rule
or procedure, but may do it in any manner consistent
with reason and fairness which he thinks will best
accomplish that purpose.
This case cited by the petitioner does not apply
to the instant case of the defendant.

The trial court was

bound by the requirements of Rule 11(e) in the instant case.
It was the trial court's responsibility to notify the defendant
before he pled guilty that, on the entrance of a plea of guilty
to three felony counts of theft by deception, that said felony
counts would be ordered to run consecutively.

The particular

case at bar raises a substantial "liberty interest" and a violation
of the defendant's "rights to due process" of law, which is
guaranteed to him under Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution
of the State of Utah, and further, under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution.
-8-

For Example:
If the trial court would have informed the defendant
of the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences
before pleading guilty, the defendant submits that he would
not have plead guilty and the end result would have substantially
been different.
Again, in this particular case, the difference between
concurrent and consecutive sentences substantially violated
the defendant's "rights to due process" of law, because of
the trial court's failure by not forewarning the defendant
of such a possibility.

The defendant has been subject to ten

additional years of imprisonment, of which is surely a "liberty
interest" on the part of the defendant.
Another case cited by the petitioner is that of State
v. Yeck, 566 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1977).

Again, the instant case

has rro similarities to that of Yeck, Supra, for the trial court
did, in fact, abuse its discretion.

SEE: State v. Vasilacopulos,

756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988).
The Court of Appeals1 decision reversing the defendant's
convictions was based on their determination that the trial
court failed to find that the defendant understood the possibility
of consecutive sentences when pleading to multiple charges.
The exchange between the trial court and defendant
was accompanied by the defendant's execution of an affidavit
to which the Court referred (R. 340, p. 6 ) . That affidavit
(R. 109-110) demonstrates that the defendant was unaware of

his rights and that he did not understand the nature of the
charges against him and the ramifications of his plea of guilty.
The affidavit of defendant fails to comply with Rule
11(e)(4) with respect to the elements of the crime charged,
and the facts relating to a charge of theft by deception.
The record in this case is silent, and the affidavit is devoid
of any such statement.

The affidavit (R. 109-110) only states

the following:
Elements:

Facts:

Incorporated in the
second information
by reference.

Incorporated in the
second information
by reference.

The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Gibbons,
Supra, quoting Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), that
"clearly the plea could not have been voluntary in the sense
that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed
the offense unless the defendant received real notice of the
nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally
recognized requirements of due process."

I.D. at 645 (quoting

Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941).

Furthermore, to

make a knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the
elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of law
to the facts.

In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969),

the Supreme Court held, in construing Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, that the factual elements of the
charges against the defendant must be explainted in the taking
of a guilty plea so that the defendant understands and admits
those elements:
-10-

[B]ecause a guilty plea is an admission of all
the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot
be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses
an understanding of the law to the facts . . . .
. . . . the judge must determine 'that the conduct
which the defendant admits constitutes the offense
charged in the indictment or information or an offense
included therein to which the defendant has plead
guilty' • " • . . . . There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating
in the record at the time the plea is entered the
defendant's understanding of the nature of the charge
against him.
I.D at 466/ 467/ 470 (citations omitted/ footnotes omitted/
emphasis in the original).

The trial court failed to follow

this Rule 11(e) requirement in the instant case of the defendant.
The affidavit also sets forths the prison term of
1 to 15 years for a second degree felony and 0 to 5 years for
a third degree felony/ but fails to show the additional 0 to
5 years for a third degree felony.

Therefore/ the minimum

and maximum period of incarceration was not disclosed to the
defendant/ nor was the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences which were imposed by the trial court/ ultimately
making the minimum sentence 1 year and the maximum sentence
of incarceration/ 25 years.

In order for the affidavit to

meet the standards set forth in Utah Rules of Criminal Prodecure,
§ 77-35-11/ and Boykin/ Supra/ the affidavit would need to
have reflected the following:
1 - 1 5 years for a crime of theft by deception/ for
a second degree felony/ and 0 - 5 years for a third
degree felony, and 0 - 5 years for a third degree
felony/ said sentences may also be ordered to run
consecutively, meaning a maximum of a 25 year prison
term being imposed.
-11-

The affidavit also indicates a $10,000,00 fine, which
is the maximum fine imposed on a felony of the second degree.
The $5,000.00 maximum fine that could be imposed on a third
degree felony was not listed.

Therefore, the additional $10,000.00

fine ordered by the trial court was in error.

The trial court

had the responsibility to notify the defendant on the record
as to the defendant's liabilities to fines on the entrance
of a guilty plea to three counts of theft by deception, and
the fines being part of the defendant's consequences of his
plea, and the ramification it would have on the defendant at
the time of his sentencing.
The petitioner, State of Utah, now cites the holdings
in Guglielmetti, Supra; Lindenman v. Morris, 641 P.2d 133 (Utah
1982), and Moxley v. Morris, 655 P.2d 641 (Utah 1982).

In

the case of Lindenman, this Court held:
The validity of the plea is further bolstered
by the appellant's acknowledgement that it was decided
upon with the full advise of counsel. I.D. at 135.
The above cases cited by the petitioner do not apply to the
case of defendant.

In Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S 637, Justice

White wrote:
[l]t is too late in the day to permit a guilty
plea to be entered against a defendant solely on the
consent of the defendant's agent, his — lawyer.
Our cases make absolutely clear that the choice to
plead guilty must be the defendant's: it is he who
must be informed of the consequences of his plea and
what it is he waives when he pleads, Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); and it is on his admission
that he is in fact guilty that his conviction will
rest. I.D. at 650.
-12-

This Court reaffirmed the findings of Henderson,
Supra, recently in the case of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987).

It held, quoting Henderson, the following for

the record:
Because of the importance of compliance with
Rule 11(e) and Boykin, the law places the burden of
establishing compliance with those requirements on
the trial judge. It is not sufficient to assume that
defense attorneys make sure that their clients fully
understand the contents of the affidavit.
Therefore, as previously stated by this Court in
Henderson and Gibbons, Supras, the petitioner's claim on the
advise of counsel to the defendant when he entered his plea
of guilty will not now stand for any kind of analysis.

Also

see: State v. Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988).
The petitioner, State of Utah, cites with respect
to the question of consecutive sentences, paragraph 7 of the
"affidavit of defendant," which reads in the pertinent part:
I also know that if I am on probation, parole,
or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which
I have been convicted or to which I have plead [sic]
guilty, my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
A mere child can see that this particular paragraph does not
apply or refer to the possibility of consecutive sentences
being imposed.

Contrary, in the plain reading of paragraph

7 of the "affidavit of defendant," it states that consecutive
sentences may result only if a person were on probation, parole,
or awaiting sentencing upon another offense to which he or
she committed prior to the plea agreement and the signing of
the instant affidavit.

Also see: Memorandum decision of the
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Honorable Timothy R. Hanson (R. 199-204 [V. v D . ] , and State
v, Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d 92 [Utah App. 1988]).
Furthermore/ the Rule 11(e) mandate is clear.

The

requirement to inform a defendant of the possibility of consecutive
sentences when pleading to multiple offenses is not discretionary.
The Rule 11(e) mandate for the acceptance of a plea of guilty
uses the word and term "shall" not "may".

Hornbook Law on

statutory interpretation of the word "shall" does not allow
for discretion to deviate.
The petitioner, State of Utah/ further recites from
the transcript of the plea proceedings at page 6 (R. 340)/
that the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: And do you understand the contents of that
document?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
The defendant/ in responding to this question by
the trial court, did understand the "affidavit of defendant"
on the issue of consecutive sentences.

Defendant understood

that by the plain reading of paragraph 7 of the Boykin affidavit/
he, in fact, could not be given consecutive sentences because
^ e did not meet the criteria as set forth in paragraph 7 of
the affidavit.
Further, it was the obligation of the trial court
to articulate on the record to the defendant, before he entered
his plea of guilty to three counts of felony theft by deception,
that said counts may be imposed consecutively.

See: Utah Code

Ann., 1982, Rule 11(e), Section 77-35-11, and Rules of Practice,
-14-

Rule 3.6, Pleas of Guilty (A)(B)(C)(D).
The petitioner. State of Utah/ recites at length
from three cases in similarity/ Warner, Brooks/ and Miller.
First/ the Miller case does not apply to the case of the defendant.
The Warner case only specifically addressed the self-incrimination
issue.

In the instant case/ the record is clear from the transcript

of hearing of defendant's change of plea held on February 17,
1984/ and the "affidavit of defendant" involving his plea.
The record as a whole in this case does not establish that
the defendant entered his plea of guilty with full knowledge
of its consequences/ including the possibility of a $20,000.00
fine, full restitution, and namely, consecutive sentences.
Further, the same would hold true in Brooks, Supra.
In Miller, this Court held:
In the instant case/ defendant has not supplied
us with a transcript of the arraignment hearing where
he entered his guilty plea or with any other evidence
that the court failed to fully explain the consequences
of the plea. (Citing: State v. Robbins/ Utah 709
P.2d 771 [1985]; State v. Jones/ Utah 657 P.2d 1263
[1982].
Again/ the Miller case is different than the case at hand.
The defendant has supplied a transcript of the change of plea
hearing dated on February 17, 1984, and has also shown clear
and concise evidence that the trial court failed to fully explain
the consequences of his plea of guilty.

See: State v. Vasilacopulos,

756 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1988).
The defendant again submits that the Utah Code Ann.,
-15-

Section 77-13-6, sets no statutory time limit for the withdrawal
of a plea of guilty, and therefore, the case cited by the petitioner
in State v. Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394 (Utah 1971) does not apply
to the instant case at hand.

This fact is further bolstered

by this Courtfs findings in State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309
(Utah 1987).

This Court held:

Section 77-13-6 sets no time limit for the withdrawal of a plea. Defendant has filed to first file
a motion to withdraw his plea, thereby disallowing
the trial court the opportunity to address an alleged
error.
The petitioner, State of Utah, now in a last-ditch
effort, cites the case of State v. Kay, 717 P.2d 1294 (Utah
1986).

The case of Kay has no similarities to that of the

instant case.

In the case of Kay, the defendant entered a

conditional plea of guilty, to avoid Utah's death penalty.
This Court held the following:
[8-10] The record before us leaves jio question
that Kay's pleas were voluntary. Kay vigorously argues
that the pleas were freely and knowingly given in
an effort to avoid the death penalty.
In addition:
[34-15] Accordingly, a Rule 11 error will not
invalidate the plea taken unless the error results
in a substantial violation of a party's rights. In
the present case, we find no error that affects the
substantial rights of a party . . .
As set forth above, the defendant submits that his
case is different that Kay.

The record in Kay supports the

fact that his plea of guilty was voluntary.

In the instant

case, the defendant is claiming something totally different.
-16-

Defendant claims that his plea of guilty to three felony counts
of theft by deception were/

in fact/ involuntary and inappropriately

taken by the trial court/ due to the trial court's failure
to comply with the statutory requirements of Rule 11(e) of
the Utah Code Ann., 1982, § 77-35-11/ in the acceptance of
defendant's plea of guilty with respect to subsection (4) and
(5) of the rule in their entirety.

Incidentally/ this Court

should also be made aware of the fact that the case cited by
the petitioner, State of Utah/ (that of Kay) was not part of
the court record below.

Nevertheless/ defendant submits that

this particular case does not apply to the instant case before
this Court.
Further/ the petitioner contends that the instant
case should be declared as a "harmless error" with respect
to Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure/ U.C.A.
1953, § 77-35-30(a) - (Repl. Vol. 8c, 1982).

Again, a mere

child can see that Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
does not apply in the instant case presently pending before
this Court for review.

A brief review of the record clearly

shows that the defendant has suffered a substantial violation
of his rights to "due process of law" on the issue of consecutive
sentences.

Furthermore, not to mention the defendant's "loss

of liberty" interests with respect to concurrent versus consecutive
sentences.

In the instant case, the difference in the amount

of time the defendant will have to serve in prison in ten years.
The defendant submits that by the trial court's failure to
-17-

protect his "rights to due process of law" when he was entering
his plea of guilty and by not informing him of the consequences
of his plea/ this Court must now affirm the decision of the
Court of Appeals to vacate the defendant's convictions.
And finally, the petitioner, State of Utah, cites
the case of State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671 (Utah 1983), which
sets forth the standard for those seeking to upset a plea of
guilty must meet:
[T]he sentence in a criminal case is a final
judgement and one who should set aside such a final
order, must proceed as the attacker and has the burden
of producing convincing proof of a fact which constitutes a legal ground for setting aside such sentence.
Again, this case does not apply to the case of this defendant.
The defendant in the instant case has surpassed the burden
of producing convincing proof of a number of facts and issues
which constitutes a legal ground for this Court to now affirm
the Utah Court of Appeals1 unanimous decision to set aside
this defendant's plea of guilty.
The defendant has shown good cause that the trial
court abused it discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his plea of guilty under Utah Code Ann., Section 77-13-6, which
sets no time limit for a defendant to withdraw his plea of
guilty.

See: State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).
Further, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly applied

the law in this particular case, and also applied the past
decisions of this Court in their unanimous opinion.
-18-

CONCLUSION
The instant case of the defendant presently before
this Court for review is a simple one in nature.

The trial

court failed to comply with state and federal statutory requirements involving the acceptance of the defendant's guilty plea
to three felony counts of theft by deception.
The Rule 11(e) mandate is clear: the requirement
to inform a defendant of the possibility of consecutive sentences
when pleading to multiple offenses is not discretionary.
rule uses the term "shall" not "may."

The

Hornbook Law on stautory

interpretation of the word "shall" does not allow for discretion
to deviate.
Therefore, as stated above, the trial court did,
in fact, abuse its discretion by not allowing the defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty.

On this particular issue,

the trial court violated the defendant's "rights to due process
of law" which are guaranteed to him under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and also under
Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
In State v. Vasilacopulos, Supra, the Utah Court
of Appeals held the following in their unanimous decision:
We conclude the record as a whole does not affirmatively establish defendant's full knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his plea under Rule
11(e)(5). Defendant has therefore satisfied his burden
of showing good cause under Section 77-13-6. The
trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's
motion to withdraw his plea. . .
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion
to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed. Defendant's
-19-

convictions are vacated/ and the matter is remanded
for further proceedings.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
We concur:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
The Utah Court of Appeals correctly found that the
trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendants
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty with respect to Section
77-13-6, of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1988, which
sets .no statutory time limit for withdrawal of a plea of guilty.
The question: How long did a defendant have to withdraw
his guilty plea? is now dispositive.

Again, Section 77-13-6

sets ri£ time limit for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty,
and this Court has held the same to be true in other cases
that have come before it on the same issues and circumstances.
Therefore, if this Court is to uphold the mandated
statutory provisions of the State of Utah as contained in the
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, 1988, and the Constitution
of the United States of America, as well as the Constitution
of the State of Utah, then it must clearly see in the interest
of justice to deny the petitioner, State of Utah f s, petition
for a Writ of Certiorari in its entirety.
DATED on this

31

day of August, 1988.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

. VASILACOPULOS
dant/Respondent
ney Pro Se
-20-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

This is to certify that I have mailed four true and
correct photocopies of the foregoing RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WR J T OP (~T;RT1i IRAKI to the following on this
31

day of August, 1988.

(1) STANLEY H. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

^

. VASILACOPULOS
dant-Respondent
ney Pro Se
Office Box 250
r, Utah 84020
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Acceptance of Mr. Carlton's own values
reveals no serious inequity or abuae of
discretion in the property distribution as
far as he is concerned. Although Mrs.
Carlton might have some reason to complain, she has not cross-appealed to challenge the trial court's award.1 The findings show that the trial court considered
each item of property. The premarital
property was delineated and awarded respectively to each party. Hers was assigned a total value; his was not Individual valuations of their premarital assets
were not material since the ultimate issue
was the equitable division of marital property, not premarital property.
Where the asset values claimed by appellant at trial show he received an equitable
share of the marital property and no dear
abuse of discretion s otherwise proven, we
ought to defer to the trial court's property
distribution. The judgment of the trial
court should be affirmed.
V> | y **••»»^««r

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent
v.
JOD C VASILACOPULOS, Del end ant
and Appellant.
No. 870291-GA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 3, 1988.
Rehearing Denied July 19, 1988.
Defe* dant appealed from order of the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho9. The property distribution b also eminently
fair when reviewed on the basis of marital income. The majority identifies a seven-year
marriage and acknowledges that Mr. Carlton
"earned over $100,000 00 gross annual income
during most of the marriage.* Their taa returns
show that his adjusted gross income ranged
from a high of 1117,000 to a low of ISS.000.
Tbc parties maintained a frugal lifestyle, except
for regular business trips that were expensed
through his CPA business* Most of the approxi-

mer F. Wilkinson, J., was denied motion to
withdraw guilty plea. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J., held that record did not
establish that defendant understood possibility of consecutive sentences when he entered plea of guilty.
Reversed, convictions vacated, and
matter remanded.

I Criminal Law *=»1149
Denial of motion to withdraw guntj
plea wflj be reversed only when it dearly
appears that the trial court has abused its
discretion. U.CJL1953, T7-1S-6.
X. Criminal Law €=»273.1(4)
Trial court may not rely on defense
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy
specific requirements of admonishing defendant before accepting plea of guflty.
UCJL1953, 77-35-ll(e).
J Courts e*l<XXl).
Where defendant entered his guilty
plea prior to date of Supreme Court decision requiring strict compliance with admonition requirements, the strict compliance
standard did not apply and test for reviewing efficacy of plea bearing was whether
the record as a whole affirmatively established that defendant entered his plea with
knowledge and understanding of its consequences. U.CJL1953, T7-35-ll(e).
4. Criminal Law «=»273.1(4)
Defendant's statement that he hat
gone over affidavit with his attorney ant
understood the contents of that guilty plea
affidavit and that he understood that b
was waiving his right to trial, to confron
witnesses, and to appeal to a higher cour
did not establish that defendant understoo
mately 1700,000 of income earned during tt
marriage was invested in liquid assets. Tt
court found an accumulation of only J228.00
I Hod it inconceivable that the remaining $473
000 of income was spent by these two people ft
consumables during their short marriage. Ml
Carlton was au*ardcd no alimony. Her $11'
000 property award, about which she has 0
complained, appears fair, equitable and c*
generous to Mr. Carlton's side of the ledf
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possibility of consecutive sentences, and
guilty plea was thus invalid. U.C.A.1953,
77-S5-U(e).
James N. Barber (argued), Salt Lake
City, for defendant and appellant
David L Wilkinson, Atty. Gen.f Stephen
J. Sorensen, AssL Atty. Gen., Stanley H.
Olson (argued), AssL Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent
Before BENCH, DAVIDSON and
JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant Jon VasDacopulos appeals
from a trial court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. We reverse and
remand
Defendant was charged by amended information with twenty felony counts of
theft by deception, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 7&-&-405 (1978). A preliminary bearing was held and defendant was
bound over for trial on eighteen of the
twenty counts. On February 17, 1984, defendant entered a guilty plea to three of
the felony counts, one second degree and
two third degree, based on a memorandum
agreement that the remaining counts
would be dismissed and sentencing would
be delayed untO August 1984. Defendant
executed an affidavit waiving his rights,
acknowledging his guilt, and affirming the
voluntariness of his plea. Defendant failed
to appear for sentencing. The trial court
issued a bench warrant, and one year later
defendant was arrested. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of incarcermtion for the three felonies and a total fine
of $20,000.

(VufcApp IfSf)

ing, a petition for writ of mandamus, and a
notice of appeal from the court's denial of
his motion to withdraw his plea. The three
actions were consolidated for appeal by order of this Court
[11 On appeal, defendant claims his
guilty plea was involuntary and improperly
taken by the trial court, and, therefore, the
trial court erred in denying his motion to
withdraw his plea. Utah Code Ann.
( 77-13-6 (1982) states, in part, "A plea of
guilty . . . may be withdrawn only upon
good cause shown and with leave of court"
The denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea will be reversed only when it clearly
appears the trial court has abused its discretion. State v. Mtldenhall, 747 P.2d 422
(Utah 1987).

Defendant argues the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to comply with
Utah RCrim.P. 11(e) (Utah Code Ann.
\ 77-35-ll(e) (1987)). Rule 11(e) states:
The court . . . shall not accept [a plea of
guilty] untO the court has made the findings:
(1) That if the defendant is not represented by counsel he has knowingly
waived his right to counsel and does
not desire counsel;
(2) That the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) That the defendant knows he has
rights against compulsory self-incrimination, to a jury trial and to confront
and cross-examine in open court the
witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of those
rights;
(4) That the defendant understands
the nature and elements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea; that
upon trial the prosecution would have
the burden of proving each of those
elements
beyond a reasonable doubt;
Defendant filed a motion for reconsideraand
that
the
plea is an admission of all
tion of sentence b November 1985, a petithose elements;
tion for habeas corpus relief in June 1986,
a motion for resentencing in February
(5) That the defendant knows the mini1987, and a motion to withdraw his plea in
mum and maximum sentence that may
September 1987. The court denied his mobe imposed upon him for each offense
tions and dismissed his petition. Defendto which a plea is entered, including
ant fOed a notice of appeal from the trial
the possibility of the imposition of concourt's denial of his motion for resentencsecutive sentences; and
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(6) Whether the tendered plea la a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement and if so, what agreement
has been reached.
See also R Prac DistCir Cts 3.6. Defendant claims the trial court failed to find he
understood the nature and elements of the
offenses and the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences, in violation
of subsections 4 and 5 of Rule 11(e).
In the companion eases of Warner v.
Morris, 709 P-2d S09 (Utah 1985), and
Brooks v Morris, 709 P.2d 310 (Utah
1985), the trial courts substantially followed the litany required by Rule 11(e). In
Warner, however, the court failed to ask
defendant whether he was aware he had a
right against compulsory self-incrimination.
Similarly, in Brooks the court failed to ask
defendant whether he understood he was
waiving his right against self-incrimination.
In both cases, the Utah Supreme Court
held, "Although the letter of Rule 11 was
not complied with, we find that the record
as a whole affirmatively establishes that
defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights he was waivi n g . . . " Warner, 709 P.2d at 810;
Brooks, 709 P.2d at 311. The Court reaffirmed its decisions in Warner and
Brooks in State v. Miller, 718 P.2d 403
(Utah 1986).
12) Subsequently, m State v. Gibbons,
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court, without acknowledging Warner, Brooks, or Miller, effectively replaced
the prior "record as a whole9* test with a
strict Rule 11(e) compliance test in accepting a defendant's guilty plea. In Gibbons,
the Court remanded defendant's appeal of
his guilty plea as defendant had failed to
first file a motion to withdraw his plea,
thereby disallowing the trial court the opportunity to address an alleged error.
However, the Court retained jurisdiction
over the ease for any necessary future
action and utilized the opportunity to issue
"a statement of law concerning the taking
of guilty pleas in all trial courts in this
state...." Id at 1312. In its statement
of law, the Gibbons Court held, "Rule 11(e)

squarely places on trial courts the burden
of ensuring that constitutional and Rule
11(e) requirements are complied with when
a guilty plea is entered." Id. Trial courts
may not rely on defense counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 11(e). Id at 1313.
Rather, with or without an affidavit or
defense counsel's advice, the trial court
must conduct an on-the-record review with
defendant of the Rule 11(e) requirements.
Id at 1314.
(3) In the instant case, defendant t>
tered his plea on February 17, 19&4.
Therefore, the strict Rule 11(e) compliance
standard established under Gibbons in
1987 does not apply. See United Slates v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 102 S.Ct 2579, 73
LEd.2d 202 (1982); State v. Norton, 675
P.2d 577 (Utah 1983) (when a new rule of
criminal procedure constitute* a clear
break with the past, it will not be applied
retroactively). Rather, we will apply the
Warner-Brooks test to determine whether
the record as a whole affirmatively establishes defendant entered his plea with fuD
knowledge and understanding of its consequences, namely the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.
[4) At defendant's change of plea hear
ing, the trial court reviewed with defendant
that upon his plea of guilty to three counts,
the prosecution would dismiss the remaining counts at the time of sentencing. The
following exchange then occurred:
Is that your intent, air?
Yes, it a.
Now have you gone over an affidavit
with your attorney?
Yes, I have.
And do you understand the contents of
that document?
Yea, I do.
And do you understand if you sign that
you will be pleading guilty, as I have
indicated to you?
Ytt
You also understand that if you sign that
you will be waiving your right to a trial,
your right to confront the witnesses,
your right to appeal to a higher court?
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Yet.
You also understand that if you were to
go to trial in this matter you would not
be compelled to take the witness stand
and testify?
Yes, I do.
Are you presently under the influence of
any type of alcohol or medication or narcotics that would impair your ability to
exercise your free consent?
No, I am not
Are you doing this of your own free will
and consent?
Yes, I am.
Do you understand that these other
counts, which I have read to you, will not
be dismissed today, but they will be held
pending until the date of sentencing?
Yes, I do.
How do you plead, air?
Guilty.
You may proceed and execute your affidavit
The trial court clearly failed to find defendant understood the possibility of consecutive sentences. The state argues the
record as a whole affirmatively establishes
defendant's full awareness of such a possibility. We disagree. The only record evidence the state can marshal for its position
is the pre-sentence report and recommendation submitted at the sentencing hearing
which was held one and one-half vears after defendant entered his plea. The record
as a whole supports a conclusion that defendant would only be subject to consecutive sentences under certain conditions.
Paragraph 7 of defendant's affidavit
states, "I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon
another offense of which I have been convicted or to which I have plead [sic] guilty,
my plea in the present action may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed on
me/'
We conclude the record as a whole does
not affirmatively establish defendant's full
knowledge and understanding of the consequences of his plea under Rule U(eX5).
Defendant has therefore satisfied his burden of showing good cause under section
77-13-6. The trial court abused its discre-

tion in denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. In light of our conclusion,
we do not reach defendant's other claim
regarding Rule 11(e)(4).
The trial court s denial of defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed. Defendant's convictions are vacated, and the matter is remanded for further
proceedings.
DAVIDSON, and JACKSON, JJ.,
concur.
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Mont R ANDERSON, Personal Representative of the Estate of Cloyd H.
Brinkerhoff, Lena Brinkerhoff, and
Mark J. Brinkerhoff, Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
Elsie BRINKERHOFF, Golda B. Adair,
Warren Brinkerhoff, Arlene B. Goulding, and John Does I thru Y, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 880122-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 9, 1988.
Purchasers of property brought action
to quiet title and for specific performance
of contract The Sixth District Court,
Kane County, Don V. Tibbs, J., entered
judgment in favor of purchasers, and appeal followed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that (1) evidence supported
finding that contract for sale of land had
not been abandoned, but rather that vendor
had waived strict compliance with contractual terms; (2) forfeiture provision of contract was not self-executing; and (3) evidence supported finding that subsequent
deeds executed by vendor to other family
members were invalid because vendor
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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JON VASILACOPULOS,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO

Petitioner,

C • 86 4 59 4

vs.
GARY DELAND, Director, Utah
State Department of Corrections>
et al.,
Respondents.

Before the Court is petitioner's request for post-conviction
relief.

The petitioner was present and represented by counsel.

The respondent was r epresented by iioiii isel

Prior to this hearing

the parties had briefed the issue which Is the subject of this
hearing.

Counsel

positions.

and the petitioner argued their

respective

The Cunrt tool* * he matter under -idv iseroent tn further

consider the authorities cited by the parties and to review, in
light of the parties' arguments, the recent Utah Supreme Court
decision of State v. Gibbons, 6 0 Utah \dv Rep
Court,

.June

arguments

30, 1987) .

and authorities

The Court
cited,

V> (Utah Supreme

has now considered the

and being

otherwise

fully

advised, enters the icLIowii'.g Menur ar iuni derision.
The Petition in this case raised a number of bases for the
post-conviction relief sought by the petitioner.

This -Court in

prior hearings has resolved a port ion cf those issues, and there
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remains for determination petitioner's claim that the trial court
failed to advise petitioner
sentences

oefore

accepting

of the possibility
'he

petitioner's

consecutive
w

qi

.

.ileas, and

that he had ineffective counsel.
The single issue for disposition at this time is the former,
is ":.he petitioner entitled t,,: relief under Pule ":v;B nf

to wit:

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the alleged failure of the
trial

court

consecut ive

to

advise

sentences

petitioner

of

wi: 1 ei i pet 111 one r

the

possibility

wa s p 1 ead i ng

of

gu i 1 t y

to

multiple charges.
A review of the transcript

of

the sentencing hearing

which the petitioner complains, is devoid
suggestion
sentences

by

the

existed.

court

that

the

The so-called

of

of

,any statement, or

possibility

of

consecutive

"Boykin 11 affidavit

fails

to

address the possibility of consecutive sentences, except
situations that are and were not applicable to this petitioner.
T h e obi i g a t1 o n o f t h e t r I a I • :: on rt 1:: ::> s o a d v i se the petitioner of
the possibility of consecutive sentences Is set out in Rule 11 of
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Ann,, 19 511 as amended).

(Section 77-35-11, Utah Code

The Rule states in part:

(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty or no contest and shall not accept such a plea
until the court has made the findings:
*

*

*

(5) That the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence that may be imposed upon him for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including the
possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences.
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The respondent suggests that the trial court1s failure to
comply with Rule 11 does not invalidate the plea, and does not
rise to the J, evel f; ,» a 1.1 cm J;ev lew indt-1; t he prov i s i ons providing
for post-conviction relief
m a n d a t e is clear.
possibility

rhis Court d i s a g r e e s .

T h e requirement t o inform a defendant o f t h e

of consecutiv e sei itenc <es M lie .i i pi ea ::I i ng to mu] tiple

offenses is not discretionary.
not "may."

T h e R u l e 11

The Rule uses the term "shall"

Hornbook law on statutory interpretation of the word

"shall" does not allow for discretion to deviate.
The Supreme Court has recently indicated that pleas must be
carefully taken, by the txi a ] courts.

in Gibbons, Justice Stewart

addressed the issue of the trial court's responsibility, and the
impropriety
affidavit.

of

relyinc

solely

upon

Whil e it, -

the

so-called

"Boykin"

iffidavit used in Gibbons

was different than the one used , the present case, the instant
affidavit is clearly deficient on the question of consecutive
sentiences

m

h e principles

of Gibbons

appiy,

This Court is

satisfied that the issue raised rises to the 1evel of required
constitutional magnitude to be considered in an appropriate case
under

the provisions

of Pule

6 SB of t h e U t a h R u l e s o f Civil

Procedure.
The issue of consecutive sentences had not been, directly put
t.iij t.Jhie sentencing judge lb way of m motion ti withdraw the plea.
While it appears from the transcript of a post-sentencing hearing
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conducted on May 1, 1987, that the issue of consecutive sentence
was discussed, there was no formal motion to withdraw the pleas
that had previously been made before the court.

Again, Gibbons

is dispositive. The matter should first be put to the sentencing
trial court.

If the petitioner is dissatisfied with the trial

court's ruling on his motion to withdraw his earlier entered
pleas, should such a motion be made, the petitioner would have
the right of direct appeal.

This Court has been informally

advised that the sentencing phase of the criminal case is on
appeal before the Utah Supreme Court, although the precise issue
addressed here has not been raised.
Proceedings under Rule 65B are in the form of "extraordinary
writs" and should only be used when all other legal remedies
usually available have been exhausted.
have not been exhausted.
at

least be

afforded

Here, the usual remedies

To the contrary, the trial judge should
the

first

opportunity

to correct any

problems in the acceptance of the petitioner's guilty pleas,
should

any

exist, before

the extraordinary

remedy

of post-

conviction relief is sought.
Accordingly, the petitioner's Petition is dismissed without
prejudice on the bases set forth above.
This Court does not address the question of competency of
counsel, or whether or not under all of the circumstances of this
case that the requirements of Rule 11 were complied with, or were
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not complied with. This Court's discussion of the plain reading
of Rule 11 is intended only to provide a basis for this Court's
determination
constitutional

that
level

the
so

as

issue
to

rises

be

dealt

to

the

with

necessary

under

proper

circumstances pursuant to Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Counsel

for

the petitioner

is to prepare

an Order in

accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit the same to
the Court for review and signature in accordance with the Local
Rules of Practice.
Dated this

/£

day of September, 1987.

_J2£
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the

foregoing

following, this

Memorandum
/£>

Decision,

postage

prepaid,

dav of September, 1987:

Kevin J. Kurumada
Attorney for Petitioner
431 East 300 South, Suite 101
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Jon C. Vasilacopulos
Pro se
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Sandra L. Sjogren
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

(^,iA±£i'j'*fi^P^nJ

to

the
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In the District Court of the Thix^iudicial District
THE STATE QFjUT^K, "'-^ w,,^
tf^
^ftA
, 7
'
Plaintiff-—;7« \ 7 *
, • krLy

—^

.vs.

7

^

c «3^w§fi%it

of Defendant

Defendant j Z - r " '
- . under oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of

guiltv to the charges) of:

;'

m

^

,

%

—m

/*,

*

^

/ •

n, ^ ft, A.yfe* a/ e £/^,(a-g) ^ # ^ &, ^ „
Elements:

Facts:

have received a copy of the charge (Information) and understand the crime f am pleading e^ilty to is a
(Degree of Felony or Class of Misdemeanor)
and understand the punishment for this crime: may
may be
be
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pn>on term

/*"I'->U^ y

Q~Sf f^

fine, or baih. I am not on drues or alcohol

My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney „
who has explained my rights to me and i understand them.

O/Vl/t

J* C

c

*t* ^ A-^

f

1. 1 know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which 1
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should i desire.
2. ! know that if! wish to have a trial. ! have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court m my
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to have those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. 1 also
know that 1 have a nght to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and
that 1 could testify on my own behalf, and that if 1 choosenot todoso. thejury will be told that this may not be heid
against me.
3.1 know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that i have a nght not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
i cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless 1 choose
to do so.
5. 1 know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that 1
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the tnal
proceedings and that if 1 could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. 1 know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty 1 am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the
preceeding paragraphs and that 1 am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered.
\ I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I have been
convicted or to which 1 have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me.

8. ( know that the fact that I have entered a pleaofguiity does not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence wul
be.
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to mduce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
pending against me, to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)):
y

will be dismissed, and that no other charge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. 1 am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or counsellor the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge.
10. 1 have read this Affidavit, or 1 have had it read to me by my attorney, and I know and understand its contents. I
am — : * ~ d a _ years of age. have attended school through the
understand the English language.
Dated this

dav of.

si

rue*
\S

Subscribed and sworn to before me in Court this.

and I can read and

<3r

19

J**.

zz
_

Defendant ^^-r
_^Defendaru
.day of
/^^^

^
19

V\

^ A

Judge
CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORN
>RNEY

, V**V*»Utmf*J*S

I certify that I am the attorneyfw
for V** ^ ^ V ^ *^f~fW05
. •- defendant named above and I know he
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him, and I discussed it with mm and believe he fully understands the
meaning of us contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements,
representations and declarations made byji^defendartrTfrtfee foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true.

i *%

fci^lfC

>4

a

CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:

C* MJ\UtMf*k} defendant
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case
1 have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a pica have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the convictior^of the defendant for the pl^ajffered, and that acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest.

Prosecuting Attorney
ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendants plea o(
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ofdered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
^.
—-"^
y
Done in Court this

/7

.....

7***-

District Judge

„<ti
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Criminal No. CR 83-820

JON C. VASILACOPULOS,
Defendant.

The State of Utah, by and through counsel, Craig
L. Barlow, Special Assistant Attorney General, and the
defendant with the advice and agreement of counsel Ronald J.
Yengich and Stephen, R.

McCaughey, hereby agree on certain

conditions tor the guilty pleas by defendant and date of
sentencing of defendant.

1

, j\-*—*~"+

w4i i pitad guilty to Counts VI (a

third degree felony), IX (a second degree felony) and XIII
(a third degree felony) of the Second Amended Information,
CR 83-820.
2.

Counts I, III, and XVIII of the Second Amended

Information are dismissed upon motion of the State.
3.

Counts II, IV, V, VII, VIII, X, XI, XII, XIV,

XV, XVI, XVII, XIX and XX of the Second Amended Information
will be dismissed upon motion of the State at the time of
sentencing.
4.

Defendant will appear before the Court on

August 20, 1984,. at 9:00 a.m. to receive a date for
sentencing and to have a pre-sentence report ordered.
5.

The delay in sentencing is a result of

agreement between the State and the defendant based upon the
following facts:
(1) That defendant's February 14, 1984 trial
date was continued by the Court (because no judges
were available to hear the case);
(2) That a new trial date would be set
approximately in June, 1984;
(3) That the trial of this matter would take
approximately eight weeks;

-2

ULLThat defendant will plead guilty in
February, 1984, on condition that the date for
sentencing is on or about the date which would
obtain if defendant were to exercise his right to
a jury trial in June, 1984; and
(5) That a delay in sentencing under the
above circumstances allows defendant the liberty
he would have if the trial were re-scheduled.
6.

During the period between the entry of the

guilty pleas and the time of sentencing the following
conditions shall apply:
(a)

Defendant will continue on bail.

(b)

Defendant shall not leave the United

States of America.
(c)

Defendant will appear before the Court

as agreed and ordered on August 20, 1984, at 9:00
a.m.

Failure to appear at that time will cause

the issuance of a warrant for defendant's arrest
and forfeiture of bail.
7.

Notwithstanding the agreement to delay

sentencing in this matter based on the conditions recited
above, upom motion of the State and good cause appearing the

3

Court may order the date for sentencing expedited.

Such an

order and sentence will not invalidate the guilty pleas.
DATED this

/7—

day of February, 1984.

\£.&A&/
CRAIG^ti BARLOW
Special Assistant Attorney
General
Attorney foe State of Utah

RONALD J. TENGICH
Attorney for Defendant

STEPHEN R. MCCAUGHEY
Attorney for Defendant

i£.OftAJ[ftfff\fruDafr

JO
VASILACOPULOS
De& ndant

-4-
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"SSSSSMs*
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
AUG
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
M. Ofson

THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

r

t£Zl'f>C

Count No. _ f l _ _ _
Honorable
HOM6B P WtUIMSQfcl
Clark
Reporter
Bailiff
Data

Defendant.

D Tha motion of _ _ _ to enter a judgment of conviction for tha next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is Q granted D denied. There taring no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant haytarfbeaayonyfctwl bffftf J2%f^' tf *Qdurt; frptasVoigtsHty:
O plee^f rh contest; of the offense of <^*l/j{*^
^^iJ
*™^*f^^**tr
a felony
of the 4*14 dagrj
for santanca and
isdemeai
represented
snow sdjudged guilty
the Staterisingrepresented byCv. idBAiAtrfrffir*
sentenced to a term in the Utah Stata Prison:
of the above often
, years and which may be for life:
D \6 a maximum mandatory term of,
| r not to exceedfiveyears;
D of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
D of not less than five years and which may be for life;
Oirot to exceed
years;
^A*A&
H|rJfMtQfdmrmA to
t o pay
nmv a
m fine
flry» iin
n ttha
h* a
m m i n t t%i
l a fltfrii •
amount
of %
ordarad to pay restitution in tha amount
• $dch santanca ia to fun concurrantty with
p4pctt santenoa ia taf rias coMacttttyaiV wHR
«rupoomoto

linJMtrmrr^

Countfs) .

O Defendant ia granted a stay of tha above (O priaon) santanca and placad on probation in tha
custody of this Court and undar tha suparvieion of tha Chief Agent, Utah Stata Oapartmant of Adult
/^aroia for tha parted of
, pursuant to tha attached craltione of probation.
W Defendant ia remandad into tha custody of tha Shartff of Salt Lake County mor delivery to the Utah Stata
Pripon, Drapar, Utah, or a for daiivary to tha Salt Lake County Jail, wham dafandant shaH be confined
and impriaonad In accordance with thi%Judgmmt and Commitment
Ir Commttnynt |haii issue
^/fafn44ft£it\

i

*** m?&z~
*

^SPROVED

ATE

m,f

o<

,f— ° ° ^ *•*

AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT £ J p T C S T
K DIXON HINDLEY
Dafanaa Counaai

Deputy County Attornay

Paga^LofL^.

IN T H I THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUOQMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

Count No.
Honorabla
Clark
Reporter
Bailiff
Data

!^V l^tt^
Dafandant.

y
ALAN SMITH

M, /fffl*r

O The motion of.
. to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted O denied. There being no legal or other reason w*y sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant ha^d^pe^onvigtedbyJ^jNtfyfl^coujt b^pteeof guHty;
O plea ej ncflbontest; of the offense of ^^^Af^
^^jj
&iEtfufaj+Pt/
a felony
of the £»f3j4Ugrp£ a\j class «_^ymisdemean*; being novj^resenkln wfo/&j*m&
for sentence snd
represented by nt^44^4datw(i
the State being represented by LLdJOaddljAum
adjudged guilty
of the above offense/is ng4 sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
&/o a maximum mandatory term of
, years and which may be for Hfe;
Dt to exceed five years;
of not leee then one year nor more than fifteen years:
D of not less thanfiveyears and which may be for life:
O not to exceed
years;
\ #
M
ajmi ordered to pey a flno In th# amount
"
and ordered to pey leatftution In th# amount

^JhJJtAjn£*u/s

run concurrently with
'4mi

**irJKlF*mr^*

'/^^^^j-

are hereby dismissed.

O Defendant is granted a stay of the above (Q prison) sentence and placed on probation In the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent Utah State Department of Adult
/erole for the period of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ pursuant to the attached conditions of probation.
r Defendant Is remanded Into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County ^for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or O for delivery to the Salt Lake County JaH, where defendant shad be confined
imprisoned in accordance wtyythis Jirdgmgntind Commitment
Commitment
shall issue
^ ffi^rij ttwd*m /
* &

APPROVEO AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT 4 # D W E S T
H. DIXON HINOUY
Defenee Counaei
Deputy County Attorney

P«*

of J2_

fclLitd^DJ
IN THE THIRD JUOICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff.

^-^^

Vto4/*&0tUt*S\
Osfsndant.

Cass No.
Count No. Honorabis
CIsrtc
Rsportsr
Bailiff _
Oats

^
^
HOMER F. W1LKIM!
ALAN SMITH

3uM^

D Ths motion of
to sntsr a judgment of conviction for ths nsxt lowsr catsgory of offsnss and
impose ssntsncs accordingly is G grantsd D dsnisd. There bdng no legal or othsr rsason wjjy ssntsncs
should not be impossd, and dsfsndant hayb^jfflyonvjs^jby^
tHtfsa of guilty;
a piss of nd/contsst; of ths offsnss ef ^^^^J^
^^[/
A~&fy*449£/
a f0jony
of ths j*ah*ya£> Q a cltw j^^/nisdsmesnf^/being noyVsssr^n^tflrt ayfe rwd^ for ssntsncs and
represented by AT» uyi/H^iASfH \H+ state being reprsssntsd by SjLJaBdaAtfmi idjudgsd guilty
of ths above offsnss/is now sentenced to a term in ths Utah Stats Prison:
D / O a maximum mandatory term of —
, years and which may be for llfr.
V not to exceedffvsyears;
O of not Isss than ons ysar nor mors than fifteen years;
D of not Isss than fivs years and which may be for life:
a /iqrto excssd
years;
ordarad to pay a fbw is tha amount of %3, K f f i \ :
i
JJL.
'
/
m
ma
a
m
o
u
n
t
Jt$jr==.
to
fflJrf&IWUX'
and ordered to p«y

o,uOuf

ssntsncs is to/un concurrently with
O Court Countfa)

T/rmrrpr>^

ars hsrsby dismissed.

/f-a?f?
O Osfsndant is grantsd a stay of ths abovs (O prison) ssntsncs and piacsd on probation in ths
cu^ody of this Court and under ths supsrvision of ths Chisf Agent, Utah Steps Dspartmant of Adult
Rirols for ths ported of
. pursuant to ths attachsd conditions of probation.
tVDsfsndanttorsmandsd into ths custody of ths Shsriff of Sait Laks County ^ o r dsUvsry to ths Utsh State
Prfaon, Draper, Utah, or O for dslivsry to ths Sait Laics County JaH, whsrs dsfsndant shsK bs confinsd
spa Impdsonsd in eccordancs withjyt Judapsnt and Commitmsnt.
I^Commitmsnt shall iasus ^^tutlUijrljJ
•
DATED this

day of

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DISTRICT COURT ju^pe-pE37
H OIXON HIND'.uY
Oafanaa Counaai
Daputy County Attornay
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RULE 4A

Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals

that is filed after the expiration of the prescribed
time shall be given to the other parties in accordance
with the rules of practice of the court from which
the appeal is taken. No extension shall exceed 30
days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the
date of entry of the order granting the motion,
whichever occurs later.

RULE 4A. TRANSFER OF CASE FROM
SUPREME COURT TO COURT OF APPEALS
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer.
(b) Notice of Order of Transfer.
(c) Receipt of Order of Transfer by Court of Appeals.
(d) Filing or Transfer of Appeal Record.
(e) Subsequent Proceedings Before Court of Appeals.
(f) Finality of Order of Transfer.
(a) Discretion of Supreme Court to Transfer.
At any time before a case is set for oral argument
before the Supreme Court, that Court may transfer
to the Court of Appeals any case except those cases
within the Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
Such order of transfer shall be issued without
opinion, written or oral, as to the merits of the
appeal or the reasons for the transfer.
(b) Notice of Order of Transfer.
Upon entry of the order of transfer by the Clerk
of the Supreme Court, that Clerk shall immediately
transmit the original of the order to the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals and give notice of entry of the
order of transfer by mail to each party to the proceeding and to the clerk of the court from which the
appeal was taken. The Clerk of the Supreme Court
shall make a note in the docket of that Court of the
service by mail.
(c) Receipt of Order of Transfer by Court of
Appeals.
Upon receipt of the original order of transfer
from the Clerk of the Supreme Court, the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals shall enter the appeal upon the
Court of Appeals docket. Notice that the appeal has
been docketed in the Court of Appeals shall thereupon be immediately given by the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals to each party to the proceeding
and to the clerk of the court from which the appeal
was taken in the same manner as is prescribed by
Rule 39(c) of these rules.
(d) Filing or Transfer of Appeal Record.
If the record on appeal has not been filed with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court at the date of the order
of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court shall
notify the clerk of the court from which the appeal
is taken that upon completion of the conditions for
filing the record by that court, the clerk shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of the Court
of Appeals. If, however, the record on appeal has
already been transmitted to and filed with the Clerk
of the Supreme Court at the date of the entry of the
order of transfer, the Clerk of the Supreme Court
shall transmit the record on appeal to the Clerk of
the Court of Appeals within five days of the date of
the entry of the order of transfer.
(e) Subsequent Proceedings Before Court of
Appeals.
Upon receipt by the Clerk of the Court of
Appeals of the order of transfer and the entry
thereof upon the docket of the Court of Appeals,
the matter or case shall proceed before the Court of
Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other
appellate cases pursuant to the rules of procedure of
the Court of Appeals.
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(f) Finality of Order of Transfer.
An order of transfer, when entered by the Clerk
of the Supreme Court, is final and shall be subject
to reconsideration only in the Supreme Court and
only on jurisdictional grounds.
RULE 4B. CERTIFICATION BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COURT
(a) Transfer.
(b) Procedure for Transfer.
(c) Criteria for Transfer.
(a) Transfer.

In any case over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction, the Court may, upon
the affirmative vote of four judges of the Court,
certify a case for immediate transfer to the Supreme
Court for determination.
(b) Procedure for Transfer.
The Court of Appeals may, on its own motion,
decide whether a case should be certified. Any party
to a case may, however, by way of a "suggestion for
certification/ file and serve a statement not exceeding five pages setting forth the reasons why the
party believes that the case should be certified. The
suggestion may not be filed prior to the filing of a
docketing statement. Within ten days of service, an
adverse party may file a statement not in excess of
five pages either supporting or opposing the suggestion for certification. If a case is certified to the
Supreme Court, the Clerk of the Court of Appeals
shall immediately transfer the case, including the
record and file of the case from the court or tribunal from which the appeal is taken, all papers filed
theretofore in the Court of Appeals, and a written
statement of all docket entries in the case up to and
including the certification order, to the Clerk of the
Supreme Court. The Clerk of the Court of Appeals
shall promptly notify all parties and the clerk of the
court from which the appeal was taken that the case
has been transferred. Upon notification that a case
has been transferred, the Clerk of the Supreme
Court shall send notices to all parties and the clerk
of the court from which the appeal was taken that
the case has been transferred to the Supreme Court
and that all further filings will be made with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court under the Rules of the
Utah Supreme Court, stating the docket number
assigned to the case in the Supreme Court.
(c) Criteria for Transfer.
The Court of Appeals shall consider certificatidi
only in the following cases:
(1) Cases which are of such a nature that it j?
apparent that the case should be decided by #
Supreme Court and that the Supreme Court wouH
probably grant a petition for writ of certiorari in th*
case if decided by the Court of Appeals, irrespecdv|
of how the Court of Appeals might rule, and
-^
(2) Cases which will govern a number of othC
cases involving the same legal issue or issues pending
in the district courts, juvenile courts, circuit courrf]
or the Court of Appeals or which are cases of ft*
impression under state or federal law that will haw
wide applicability.

RULE 4C. TRANSFER OF IMPROPERLY
PURSUED APPEALS
If a notice of appeal or a petition for reviews
filed in a timely manner but is incorrectly pursuedjB
the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Cottjj
the Court of Appeals', either on motion of anyyp"3
or sua sponte, shall transfer the case, including
in* ^

For Annotations, consult CODE* Co'* Annotation Service
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